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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Aims of the dissertation 
The aim of this master‘s dissertation is to clarify how white phosphorus (WP) weapons 
are regulated under international law, particularly in regard to the main applications of 
WP weapons as a means of warfare. I will discuss the status of WP weapons and its 
main applications in general terms in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(1993), the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980) and customary 
international humanitarian law.
1
 If it becomes evident that there is significant 
disagreement and lack of clarity about the legal regulations of WP weapons – or if it 
seems there may be a significant gap between the actual legal regulations and the 
opinion about WP weapons among states or in the general public – then I will also 
briefly comment on how this gap may be closed through treaty regulation in the future.  
I will not discuss the relevance of the international regulations on poison and 
poison gas, which features in some of the legal analyses of WP weapons.
2
 There are two 
reasons for this: First, there is a need to limit the scope of this dissertation. Second, 
there does not seem to be any significant disagreement that WP weapons do not fall 
under the definitions of poison or poisonous gas in the relevant conventions.
3
  
I will use some specific historical cases to exemplify the application of WP 
weapons, most importantly the use of WP by the US military in Fallujah in 2004 and by 
                                                 
1
 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons 
and on their destruction, 1993; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, 1980.  
2
 I. J. MacLeod and A.P.V. Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, in Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law, Volume 10 (2007): 79-82; Joseph D. Tessier, ―Shake & Bake: Dual-
Use Chemicals, Contexts, and the Illegality of American White Phosphorus Attacks in Iraq‖, Pierce Law 
Review, Volume 6, No. 2, 2007: 326-327; Steven Haines, ―Weapons, means and methods of warfare‖, in 
Elisabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), 259.  
3
 The relevant conventions are the folowing: Declaration (IV,2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases, The 
Hague, 29 July 1899; Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907; Protocol 
for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925. 
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the Israeli military in Gaza 2008-2009 (Operation Cast Lead). These are important 
examples of how WP has been used as a means of warfare in the past decade. I will not, 
however, attempt to draw conclusions about the legality of these concrete examples. 
The reason is that I attempt to comment in this dissertation on the regulation of WP 
weapons in general, not in specific cases.  
 
1.2 Literature 
The most cited article in this dissertation is I.J. MacLeod and A.P.V. Rogers‘ ―The Use 
of WP and the Law of War‖ (2007).4 One of the authors is a legal expert and the other 
holds a PhD in pathology as well as an LL.M in international law, which increases the 
credibility of the arguments of the article also as far as the medical conclusions are 
concerned.
5
 The immediate backdrop of the article is the use of WP in Fallujah, Iraq, in 
2004 and in Lebanon in 2006. The article comments on the specific applications in 
these two conflicts, but mainly deals with the international regulation of WP in general.  
 I also frequently cite Roman O. Reyhani‘s article, ―The Legality of the Use of 
White Phosphorus by the United States Military during the 2004 Fallujah Assaults‖ 
(2007), and Joseph D. Tessier‘s article ―Shake & Bake: Dual-Use Chemicals, Contexts, 
and the Illegality of American White Phosphorus Attacks in Iraq‖ (2007).6 Both articles 
deal mainly with the use of WP in Fallujah, but also make observations about the 
relevant international legal framework in general. Reyhani‘s article, in particular, 
contains certain viewpoints that deviate from those of MacLeod and Rogers.  
 There is a very extensive volume of works that deal with the law of armed 
conflict in general that could be cited in this dissertation. For obvious practical reasons, 
it has been necessary to limit this number. I refer mainly to the treatment of WP in 
Yoram Dinstein‘s The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict and Gary D. Solis‘ The Law of Armed Conflict.7 Both treatments of WP are 
                                                 
4
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖.  
5
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 75. Authors‘ background in 
footnote 1. 
6
 Roman O. Reyhani, “The Legality of the Use of White Phosphorus by the United States Military 
during the 2004 Fallujah Assaults”, bepress Legal Series, Paper 1959 (Berkeley: Berkeley Electronic 
Press, 2007), accessed on 27 May 201,1 http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1959.  
7
 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, second 
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010); Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict.  
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short but concise and informative, and clearly express views that I compare with those 
of the above-mentioned.  
 Certainly, no treatment of the law of armed conflict can ignore the 2005 study 
by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck et al., Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, which presents a comprehensive set of rules of customary 
international humanitarian law.
8
 This study (hereafter: ―The 2005 ICRC Study‖) is 
widely regarded today as the standard reference work of customary international 
humanitarian law. It is central in this dissertation‘s treatment of the rules that may be 
relevant for WP weapons.  
I also make use of the report by Human Rights Watch on Operation Cast Lead in 
Gaza, Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza (2009).9 This 
report is an attempt at an objective investigation into the use of WP weapons in Gaza, 
but it has been subjected to strong criticism, particularly from Israeli officials.
10
 
However, the report documents important facts about the use of WP in a specific 
military context – including with pictures of such use – and makes statements about the 
legal status of WP weapons that are of interest to this dissertation. Another report of 
interest is the so-called ―Goldstone report‖, which is the report of a commission 
mandated by the United Nations Human Rights Council to investigate Operation Cast 
Lead in Gaza.
11
 This too, has been heavily criticized by the Israeli government and 
others.
12
 It was, however, endorsed by the majority of the Human Rights Council.
13
 It 
contains important expert views about the legality of WP weapons.  
                                                 
8
 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, with contributions from Carolin Alvermann, Knut 
Dörmann and Baptiste Rolle, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005). 
9
 Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza (New York: 
Human Rights Watch 2009).  
10
 Guy Azriel: "Israel, Hamas investigations into Gaza incursion lacking", CNN Report, 11 April 2010, 
accessed on 17 August 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-
11/world/mideast.conflict.report_1_civilians-israeli-forces-gaza?_s=PM:WORLD. Yigal Palmor, 
spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, is reported to have said that ―[...] Human Rights Watch got 
their facts and figures wrong‖ and displayed a ―[...] lack of professional integrity and they are therefore 
not to be taken as an authority to judge and evaluate IDF operations.‖  
11
 Richard Goldstone et al., Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of 
the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009.  
12
 Danna Harman, ―Goldstone panel colleagues rebut judge's mea culpa‖, Ha'aretz, 15 April 2011, 
accessed on 17 August 2011,  http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/goldstone-panel-colleagues-
rebut-judge-s-mea-culpa-1.356045. Yigal Palmor, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, is reported to 
 4 
As regards the medical information, I have relied on information published in 
medical journals, particularly a case report on a patient with WP burns, published in 
The Lancet (2010), and an article about burn injuries during armed conflicts, published 
in the Annals of Burns and Fire Disaster (2007).
14
  
 Finally, I cite several newspaper articles in this dissertation. These are used to 
provide facts about specific situations and viewpoints when this is relevant, and as 
indications of the view of states and the general public on certain relevant issues.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Text 
Chapter 2 describes the most important attributes, military applications and medical 
effects of WP, and also presents a brief historical background. These facts form the 
basis for the discussion in the succeeding chapters, which deal with the legal issues 
connected with regulation of WP weapons that may be contained in relevant 
conventions or in relevant rules of customary international humanitarian law. In chapter 
3, I discuss how WP weapons may be regulated by the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
as toxic chemicals or riot control agents. In chapter 4, I discuss how WP weapons may 
be regulated in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, specifically Protocol 
III on incendiary weapons. In chapter 5, I discuss how certain rules of customary 
international humanitarian law may apply to WP weapons. I specifically focus on (1) 
the principle of no unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, (2) the principle of 
distinction between civilian and military targets, and (3) the so-called Martens clause.  
 Chapter 6 presents general comments on the legality of WP weapons and its 
main applications, based on the conclusions of the previous chapters. Finally, chapter 7 
discusses briefly whether there may be a case for stronger international regulation of 
WP weapons.  
                                                                                                                                               
have said about the Goldstone report that ―[t]he whole process was deeply tainted by political bias and an 
extremist dominance over the U.N. Human Rights Commission by nondemocratic countries‖.  
13
 UN Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/S-12/1, 12th Session, 16 October 2009, part B, 
operative paragraph 3, accessed on 10 August 2011, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/LTD/G09/168/07/PDF/G0916807.pdf?OpenElement  
14
 Loai Nabil Al Barqouni, Sobhi I. Skaik, Nafiz R. Abu Shaban, Nabil Barqouni, ―Case Report: White 
Phosphorus Burn‖, The Lancet 376 (2010): 68; B.S. Atiyeh, S.W.A. Gunn, S.N Hayek, ―Military and 
Civilian Burn Injuries during Armed Conflicts‖, Annals of Burns and Fire Disasters, Vol. XX, No. 4 
(December 2007), accessed on 1 June 2011, 
http://www.medbc.com/annals/review/vol_20/num_4/text/vol20n4p203.asp (no page numbers).  The 
Lancet is one of the world‘s most respected, oldest and leading medical journals.  
 5 
2  White Phosphorus: Military Applications and Medical Effects  
2.1 What are White Phosphorus Weapons? 
WP is a common chemical substance, which has both military and non-military 
applications. In the latter category, one can find WP used in fireworks, food additives, 
fertilisers, and cleaning compounds, to mention a few.
15
 In the former category, WP is 
primarily used to provide smoke or as an incendiary, i.e. to set fire to objects or persons. 
A case report in the medical journal The Lancet describes WP as follows: 
 
White phosphorus is a smoke-producing, waxy, yellow transparent combustible solid, 
which is used mainly in military and industrial settings. In the presence of oxygen, it 
spontaneously ignites with a yellow flame and produces dense smoke; it extinguishes 
only when deprived of oxygen or totally consumed. On contact with exposed skin, 
white phosphorus produces painful chemical burns.
16
 
 
There are three common types of WP-containing projectiles: (1) Flares on parachutes 
for illumination of roads, (2) canisters that fall on the ground, burn and emit smoke for 
smoke screens – or eject wedges saturated with WP that fall to the ground in an 
elliptical pattern and eject smoke, and (3) burster rounds, either with point detonating 
fuse or a time fuse, set to burst at a given height above the ground – these burn with 
intense heat and emit dense white smoke.
17
 WP weapons can be in the form of aerial-
delivered bombs, artillery shells, and grenades. WP ignites spontaneously in air at 44 
degrees Centigrade (111.2 degrees Fahrenheit) and produce flames of 800 degrees 
Centigrade, up to 816 degrees Centigrade when it is in contact with oxygen (1,501 
degrees Fahrenheit).
18
 In Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli military mostly used 155 
                                                 
15
 Reyhani, ―The Legality of the Use of White Phosphorus‖; Tessier, ―Shake & Bake‖. 16.  
16
 Al Barqouni et al., ―Case Report: White Phosphorus Burn‖, 68.  
17
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 76-77.  
18
 Atiyeh et al., ―Military and Civilian Burn Injuries during Armed Conflicts‖; Human Rights Watch, 
Rain of Fire, 3. 
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millimetre artillery shells, which air-bursts and spreads 116 wedges totalling 5.78 kilos 
of WP in a radius up to 125 meters.
19
  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, I concentrate on five main modes of application of 
WP weapons. These modes of applications share two important characteristics, namely 
that the munitions burst and that they have at least the potential to cover wider areas 
with WP fragments:  
1. Use of bursting WP for creation of a smoke screen/as an obscurant. WP is 
considered ideal for this purpose, as it almost instantaneously produces a dense 
white smoke that can obscure military movements.
20
 In this category I also 
include the use of WP for protection against infra-red tracking systems.
21
 The 
obscurant function of WP is possibly the most common.
22
 General Peter Pace, as 
chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said the obscurant function of WP 
was one of two main functions, the other being to mark a target.
23
  
 
2. Use of WP burster rounds for illumination. WP can be used to illuminate a 
battlefield at night.
24
 Illumination can be achieved in two ways: First, WP flares 
can be attached to parachutes and, second, rounds can be designed to burst in the 
air and eject scatter burning WP.
25
 I will not discuss the former category in this 
dissertation because it is technically quite remote from the other applications 
that I discuss. The optimal air-burst altitude for the burster rounds for 
illumination is 500 meters above ground, which should be high enough for there 
to be little danger of burning fragments hitting individuals on the ground.
26
  
 
3. Use of WP for marking a target. This function may include marking for 
assisting in range-finding and/or in preparing subsequent strikes from the air or 
the ground.
27
  
 
4. Use of WP for “flushing out” combatants. This refers to the controversial tactic 
where WP rounds are fired into confined spaces where enemy combatants are 
taking cover, in order to drive them out and then rendering them hors de combat 
with other weapons. The tactic was applied by the US military in Fallujah in 
                                                 
19
 Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, 3, 11. 
20
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 76.  
21
 Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, 2. 
22
 Reyhani, ―The Legality of the Use of White Phosphorus‖, 17.  
23
 ―U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Munitions in Iraq‖, The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 100, No. 2 (April 2006): 487.  
24
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 76. 
25
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 76-77. 
26
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 77. 
27
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 76; ―U.S. Defends Use of 
White Phosphorus Munitions in Iraq‖, 487.  
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2004, but also in World War II and in the Falklands war.
28
 The tactic is often 
referred to as ―shake and bake‖, owing to the jargon of US military personnel 
who have described their use of WP in Fallujah.
29
  
 
5. Use of WP for incendiary purposes, i.e. setting fire to persons or objects.30 
 
Image 1
31
 
 
                                                 
28
 Tessier, ―Shake & Bake‖, 347-348.  
29
 Reyhani, ―The Legality of the Use of White Phosphorus‖, 10; Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed 
Conflict: International Law in War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 598. 
30
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 76; Gary D. Solis, The 
Law of Armed Conflict: International Law in War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 598. 
Solis writes that the primary uses of white phosphorus is to produce a smoke screen, provide 
illumination, and for incendiary purposes.  
31
 Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, 23.  
 8 
 
 
 
2.2 Effects of White Phosphorus on Humans 
When in contact with human skin, WP causes both chemical and thermal burns.
32
 While 
the thermal burns are caused by the generated heat, the chemical burns result from 
several different compounds that are produced through chemical reactions. This 
includes the production of phosphorus pentoxide, which can react with the water in skin 
and produce corrosive phosphoric acids.
33
 There is no doubt that WP burns on human 
tissue can cause serious damage to internal organs, possibly death.
34
 WP chemical burns 
can cause damage deep into underlying tissues, resulting in delayed healing.
35
 In the 
case of burn wounds, WP can be absorbed systemically in the body, leading to multiple 
organ dysfunction syndrome, because of the effect it has on erythrocytes, kidneys, liver, 
and heart.
36
 WP burns are associated with significant morbidity, and often necessitate 
lengthy hospital stays.
37
  
A medical case report from Gaza describes the treatment of a patient with WP 
burns: An 18-year old man came to be treated in the emergency department after an 
attack with an incendiary shell. He was diagnosed with WP burns, covering 30 percent 
of his body. One day after admission to the burns unit, white smoke was noticed 
emanating from the wounds, and he was transferred to the operating room for removal 
of WP particles. During the procedure, as WP particle was accidentally dislodged and 
resulted in a superficial burn on a nurse‘s neck. The patient was discharged after eight 
                                                 
32
 Federation of American Scientists, ―White Phosphorus Fact Sheet‖, accessed on 19 September 2011, 
http://www.fas.org/programs/bio/factsheets/whitephosphorusfactsheet.html; Al Barqouni et al., ―Case 
Report: White Phosphorus Burn‖, 68; R. Seth, D. Chester, and N. Moiemen, ―A review of chemical 
burns‖, Trauma 9 (2007): 87. 
33 Federation of American Scientists, ―White Phosphorus Fact Sheet‖.  
34
 Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, 3. 
35
 Al Barqouni et al., ―Case Report: White Phosphorus Burn‖, 68; ICRC: Weapons that may Cause 
Unnecessary Suffering or have Indiscriminate Effects: Report on the Work of Experts (Geneva: ICRC, 
1973), 63 (para. 218). 
36
 Al Barqouni et al., ―Case Report: White Phosphorus Burn‖, 68. 
37
 Al Barqouni et al., ―Case Report: White Phosphorus Burn‖, 68. 
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days.
38
 The risk of re-ignition of WP in wounds is significant, since any remaining WP 
will re-ignite when re-exposed to oxygen.
39
  
 
The medical case report included photos of some of the patient‘s wounds:  
 
Image 2
40
 
 
 
 
Inhalation of WP smoke is also hazardous to humans: Combustion of WP results in the 
formation of phosphorus pentoxide, which is a severe pulmonary irritant. In a closed 
space, this may reach concentrations sufficient to cause acute inflammatory changes in 
the tracheobronchial tree (i.e. the human airways).
41
  
 
                                                 
38
 Al Barqouni et al., ―Case Report: White Phosphorus Burn‖, 68.  
39
 Atiyeh et al., ―Military and Civilian Burn Injuries during Armed Conflicts‖. 
40
 Al Barqouni et al., ―Case Report: White phosphorus burn‖, 68. 
41
 Atiyeh et al., ―Military and Civilian Burn Injuries during Armed Conflicts‖. 
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2.3 A Brief Military History of White Phosphorus  
WP was used as a means of warfare in World War I and World War II.
42
 According to 
one source, there were calls to ban WP already after World War I, because of the 
painful falling burning fragments.
43
 It was also used by the Russian Military in Grozny, 
Chechnya, in 1994.
44
 The military application of WP may be on the increase in the 21th 
century, seeing how it has featured in many recent conflicts.
45
 Ethiopia was accused by 
UN arms monitors of using WP against both insurgents and civilians in Somalia in 
2007.
46
 According to the Israeli daily Ha‘aretz, Israeli officials have admitted use of 
WP directly against Hezbollah in 2006.
47
  
WP seems to be used by a range of states‘ military forces, and also by non-state 
actors. Iraqi dissidents have claimed that it was used by the Iraqi government in 
Nasiriya in March 1994, where Ali Hassan Al Majid (Chemical Ali) used WP and 
napalm to set fire to civilian houses.
48
 As far as non-state actors are concerned, it is 
noteworthy that, according to Israeli police, Hamas fired a WP shell in the direction of 
Sderot in Israel on 14 January 2009.
49
 In Afghanistan, both the foreign troops and the 
Taleban have made use of WP. Colonel Gregory Julian, spokesman for the commander 
of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, has said foreign troops in the country use WP 
munitions for illumination and as an incendiary to destroy enemy equipment and 
bunkers.
50
 The US military have accused Taleban for extensive use of WP in attacks 
against US forces and in civilian areas.
51
  
The two most discussed events involving use of WP in the past decade is the use 
by the US military in Fallujah, Iraq, in April and November 2004, and the use of it by 
the Israeli military in Gaza in 2009. The controversy over the use of WP in Fallujah is 
the immediate raison d’être for some of the articles to which I refer the most in this 
                                                 
42
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 77. 
43
 Ian Sample, ―What is white phosphorus?‖, The Guardian, 19 November 2005.  
44
 Tessier, ―Shake & Bake‖, 349-350.  
45
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 78. 
46
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 78. Authors cite as source: 
―US, Ethiopia accused over Somalia‖, The Financial Times, 27 July, 2007.  
47
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 77. 
48
 Tessier, ―Shake & Bake‖, 354. 
49
 Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, 14. Human Rights Watch questions the claim. 
50
 Paul Tait (ed.), ―Key facts about white phosphorus munitions‖, Reuters News, 8 May 2009.  
51
 Jason Straziuso, ―US military: 44 Afghan cases of white phosphorus‖, Associated Press, 11 May 2009; 
Michael Evans, ―Taleban using British white phosphorus: US papers show banned material was found 
across Afghanistan‖, The Times, 12 May 2009. 
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dissertation.
52
 Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Venable has described the use of WP 
in Fallujah in the following manner:  
 
When you have enemy forces that are in covered positions [...] one technique is to fire a 
white phosphorus round into the position because the combined effects of the fire and 
smoke—and in some cases the terror brought about by the explosion on the ground—
will drive them out of the holes so that you can kill them with high explosives.
53
 
  
This tactic, which involved the use of WP at least indirectly against enemy combatants 
with lethal effect, sparked significant international criticism in 2005, after Italian public 
television showed a documentary that renewed persistent charges concerning US‘ use of 
WP rounds.
54
 The US government has dismissed accusations that WP was used 
illegally.
55
  
 The use of WP by the Israeli military in Gaza has also been heavily criticised 
both during and after the event.
56
 Human Rights Watch has accused the Israeli of using 
WP over populated areas in violation of international humanitarian law.
57
 The report 
from a UN Human Rights Council probe into the military operation in Gaza – the so-
called Goldstone report – also heavily criticised the Israeli use of WP.58 The Israeli 
government has confirmed its use of WP, but denied the accusations that it was 
systematically used in an illegal manner, stressing its use as an obscurant.
59
  
 
 
                                                 
52
 MacLeod and Rogers, ―The Use of White Phosphorus and the Law of War‖, 76. Tessier, ―Shake & 
Bake‖, 324-325. Reyhani, ―The Legality of the Use of White Phosphorus‖, 3.  
53
 Tessier, ―Shake & Bake‖, 324. Tessier‘s source is ―U.S. Forces Used ‗Chemical Weapon‘ in Iraq‖, The 
Independent, 16 November, 2005.  
54
 Scott Shane, ―Defense of Phosphorus Use Turns Into Damage Control‖, The New York Times, 21 
November 2005. See also Tessier, ―Shake & Bake‖, 340.  
55
 See f. ex. ―U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Munitions in Iraq‖, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2 (April 2006), 487.  
56
 On the media coverage during the military operation, see Sheera Frenkel, ―Israel backs down over 
white phosphorus‖, The Times, 23 April 2009. 
57
 Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire, 1.  
58
 Goldstone et al., Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, 21 (para 48).  
59
 James Hider and Sheera Frenkel: ―Israel admits using white phosphorus in attacks on Gaza‖, The 
Times, 24 January 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5575070.ece 
(Accessed 05.08.2011). 
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3  White Phosphorus and the Chemical Weapons Convention 
The following discussion will be divided into two parts: First, I discuss whether WP 
weapons fall in the category of ―toxic weapons‖ as defined in the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and whether and to what extent the common uses of WP weapons are 
regulated by this convention. Second, I discuss whether WP weapons fall in the 
category of ―Riot Control Agents‖, as defined in the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
and whether and to what extent the uses of WP weapons are regulated as such.  
 
3.1 Is White Phosphorus a Toxic Chemical? 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (short for the Convention on the prohibition of the 
development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their 
destruction, 1993) prohibits the use of chemical weapons in all circumstances. The ban 
is total, including not only the use of such weapons, but acquirement, stockpiling and 
transferral.
60
 The definition of a ―chemical weapon‖ is found in Article II(1)(a) through 
(c), but only Article II(1)(a) is relevant to the discussion of WP. The definitions in 
article II(1)(b) and (c) state that for the toxic chemical to fall under the definition of a 
chemical weapon, it must be ―specifically designed‖ to cause harm or death as a result 
of the chemical component. One would be hard pressed to say that WP weapons are 
specifically designed to such purposes, and it thus falls outside the definition in (b) and 
(c).
61
  
Article II(1)(a), however, defines a chemical weapon as: ―Toxic chemicals and 
their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes‖.62 
The application of the chemical is important: The definition in Article II(1)(a) excludes 
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toxic chemicals that are applied in a manner not prohibited under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. What is meant in this regard is the potential use of the weapon, 
not its purpose of design.
63
 
 
―Toxic chemical‖ is defined in Article II(2):  
 
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all 
such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and 
regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. 
 
A ―precursor‖ of a toxic chemical is defined in Article II(3): ―Any chemical reactant 
which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic 
chemical.‖  
WP is not mentioned in the annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention, where 
some of the chemicals prohibited are listed. The annex is not exhaustive, however, and 
only includes those chemicals that have been identified for the application of 
verification measures in the Convention.
64
  
There is no disagreement that WP has toxic properties when it causes chemical 
burns on human skin. Tessier concludes that it is ―well established‖ that WP causes 
chemical burns that may cause system toxicity or death if not treated.
65
 MacLeod and 
Rogers reach the same conclusion.
66
 In their line of argumentation, they cite the NATO 
Handbook on emergency war surgery, which states that WP burns result in a ―vastly 
increased mortality rate‖ among animal models, compared to non-phosphorus burns.67 
Moreover, studies on individuals accidentally burned by WP have shown that dermal 
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exposure can result in kidney and liver abnormalities.
68
 Solis, although arguing that WP 
weapons are not chemical weapons, also concludes that WP has toxic properties.
69
  
This conclusion is no doubt in line with medical expertise on the subject. In a 
case report in The Lancet, Loai Nabil Al Barqouni et al. wrote the following:  
 
Because white phosphorus has high lipid solubility, the injuries often extend deep into 
underlying tissues with resultant delayed wound healing. White phosphorus can also be 
absorbed systemically resulting in multiple organ dysfunction syndrome because of its 
effect on erythrocytes, kidneys, liver, and heart.
70
 
 
If indeed the systemic absorption of WP results in multiple organ dysfunction 
syndrome, there can be no doubt that it should be seen as toxic chemical as defined in 
the Chemical Weapons Convention. This definition includes chemicals that cause 
―permanent harm to humans or animals‖ through its chemical action on life processes.71 
The same conclusion is reached by B.S. Atiyeh et al., who from the perspective of the 
medical profession, concludes that WP must be classified as a toxic chemical.
72
 Finally, 
the US Environmental Protection Agency labels WP as ―extremely toxic to humans‖.73  
WP could also be seen as a precursor of a chemical weapon, if the gas that is 
formed by its reaction with oxygen can be labelled as toxic. This gas, ―phosphorus 
pentoxide‖, is widely considered to be toxic. MacLeod and Rogers argue that the gas is 
―toxic‖ – because continued exposure leads to the a number of injuries that are related 
to the inherent toxicity of the chemical – but also states that the greatest danger from 
WP is not the inhalation of smoke, but being struck by burning fragments.
74
 Reyhani 
also argues that the gas is toxic.
75
 B.S. Altiyeh et al. (from the perspecive of the medical 
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profession) describes it as ―[...] a severe pulmonary irritant, which in a closed space 
may reach concentrations sufficient to cause acute inflammatory changes in the 
tracheobronchial tree.‖76 Tessier concludes that phosphorus pentoxide is toxic.77  
 The definition in Article II(2) is very wide: The category ―toxic chemical‖ 
includes any chemical that can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent 
harm to humans or animals through its chemical action on life processes. A study by the 
U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine states that continued 
exposure to the vapours of WP ―can lead to bronchitis, persistent coughing, severe 
burns, weakness, anemia, loss of appetite, and possibly pneumonia‖.78 There is no 
mention in Chemical Weapons Convention Article II(2) of how long the exposure to the 
chemical would have to be, in order for the relevant effects to occur. For this reason, it 
seems that the definition in this article is wide enough to cover WP smoke.  
 
The conclusion is that there seems to be no doubt that WP should be classified as a 
―toxic chemical‖, in as much as the chemical burns it causes upon contact with human 
skin results in toxicity. It seems equally clear that the chemical by-product of WP, 
―phosphorus pentoxide‖, has toxic properties. The definition of ―toxic chemical‖ in 
Chemical Weapons Convention Article II(2) is wide and covers WP smoke as well as 
WP.  
 
3.2 Do the Toxic Properties of White Phosphorus Mean that it is Prohibited as a 
Chemical Weapon? 
Despite the consensus regarding classification of WP as a toxic chemical, there is 
disagreement among legal experts whether WP is a chemical weapon. The disagreement 
centres on the interpretation of Convention‘s Article II(9)(c). This article excludes from 
the ―chemical weapons‖ category, as defined in Article II(1)(a) those chemicals whose 
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―military purposes are not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not 
dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare.‖79 
The question is thus whether the military purposes of WP weapons are connected with, 
or dependent on, the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare.  
MacLeod and Rogers conclude that WP, although de jure a chemical weapon as 
defined in the Chemical Weapons Convention, is not prohibited in its most common 
applications: providing illumination and producing smoke screens. Even the ―flushing 
out‖ application of WP is permitted under the Chemical Weapons Convention, they 
argue, because this tactic was not dependent on the toxic properties of WP.
80
 Solis takes 
the same view, concluding that Chemical Weapons Convention Article II(9)(c) implies 
that the primary uses of WP are not illegal, including the production of a smoke screen, 
providing illumination, and use for incendiary purposes.
81
 He also argues that the use of 
WP in Fallujah was also not illegal under the Chemical Weapons Convention, because 
WP was used for incendiary purposes, not chemical or toxic.
82
  
 Reyhani, on the other hand, argues that the application of WP to ―flush out‖ 
enemy combatants was illegal.
83
 Contrary to Solis‘ conclusion, both Reyhani and 
Tessier claim that the use of WP in Fallujah was indeed dependent on the toxic 
properties of WP.
84
  
Peter Kaiser, spokesman for the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, the international body responsible for implementation of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention), made a statement on the legal status of WP in 2004, 
following the debate about WP application in Fallujah:  
 
[WP] is not forbidden by the CWC if it is used within the context of a military 
application which does not tend to require or does not intend to use the toxic properties 
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of white phosphorus. White phosphorus is normally used to produce smoke, to 
camouflage movement. 
 
If that is the purpose for which the white phosphorus is used, then that is considered 
under the Convention legitimate use. If on the other hand, the toxic properties of white 
phosphorus, the caustic properties, are specifically intended to be used as a weapon, 
that of course is prohibited, because the way the Convention is structured or the way it 
is in fact applied, any chemicals used against humans or animals that cause harm or 
death through the toxic properties of the chemical are considered chemical weapons.
85
 
 
There seems to be the consensus opinion that the application of WP weapons is what 
determines the legality. I have concluded that both the WP smoke, and WP in itself 
(through dermal exposure), are toxic chemicals, as defined in Chemical Weapons 
Convention Article II(2). Following this, the application of WP weapons, when 
depending on these toxic properties as a method of warfare, would be illegal according 
to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The regular applications of WP weapons, 
providing smoke screen and illumination, are clearly not dependent on the toxicity of 
WP, and are thus not illegal under Chemical Weapons Convention. Nor is it illegal to 
use WP to set fire to, or mark, an object that is a military target.  
The legality of using WP directly against enemy combatants is less clear, 
however. As mentioned above, Reyhani and Tessier argue that the use of WP in 
Fallujah was dependent on the toxic properties of WP, whereas Solis and MacLeod and 
Rogers disagree.
86
 Much of the evidence does seem to point in the direction of the 
former‘s conclusion, particularly statements from military personnel involved in the 
events under discussion. Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Venable, for example, said 
that the ―flushing out‖ tactic depended on the ―combined effects of the fire and 
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smoke‖.87 He did not say, of course, that the smoke had to be toxic. Still, if the smoke in 
fact is toxic, it is certainly a case of using toxic smoke as a weapon against personnel.  
One could interject that, in fact, all smoke is toxic, if only the concentration is of 
a sufficient degree. Still, we do not generally consider, say, burning wood to be a 
chemical weapon even though the resulting smoke can be lethal. Technically, however, 
the source of the toxic gas is not relevant. If a weapon is designed to poison combatants 
with carbon monoxide – a toxic by-product of burning wood – it would certainly have 
to be considered a chemical weapon under the convention, regardless of the fact that 
human exposure to this gas is very common.  
Toxicity is in the definition in Article II(2) contingent on the possible effects of 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm. It is not definitively proven that the 
use of WP in Fallujah was intended to bring about these effects as a direct result of WP. 
Furthermore, the toxicity of WP smoke does not seem to have been a necessary 
component for the ―flushing out‖ tactic to be successful. This would depend on a wide 
definition of ―temporary incapacitation‖, which is not further defined in Chemical 
Weapons Convention. The term ―incapacitating agent‖ is defined in The Oxford 
Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military: ―An agent that produces temporary 
physiological or mental effects, or both, that will render individuals incapable of 
concerted effort in the performance of their assigned duties.‖88 By this definition, one 
could certainly say that the use of WP in Fallujah was dependent on its effect of 
―temporary incapacitation‖. WP was successful in ―flushing out‖ enemy combatants 
precisely because it rendered individuals incapable of concerted effort in the 
performance of their duties (i.e. to hold a certain position for combat purposes).  
 
The conclusion is that WP weapons falls outside the boundaries set for illegal chemical 
weapons in Chemical Weapons Convention in its most common applications, due to the 
specific requirements in Article II(9)(c). WP used for providing illumination or a smoke 
screen, or for marking a target or setting fire to an object, is not illegal under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. If WP is used in a manner dependent on its toxicity, 
however, it would be illegal according to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The use 
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of WP for ―flushing out‖ enemy combatants was dependent on WP toxic properties, and 
therefore not permitted under the Chemical Weapons Convention.  
 
 
3.3 Are White Phosphorus Weapons Prohibited by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention as Riot Control Agents? 
Some have argued that certain applications of WP entail that it is used as a ―Riot 
Control Agent‖ (RCA). Such agents are also regulated in Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Concretely, Article I(5) states that: ―Each State Party undertakes not to use 
riot control agents as a method of warfare‖.89 The term ―Riot Control Agent‖ is defined 
in Chemical Weapons Convention Article II(7): ―Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, 
which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects 
which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.‖ It is not in 
dispute that short-time exposure to WP smoke has short-term and temporary sensory 
irritation as an effect. For this reason, it is difficult not to agree with Reyhani, who 
claims that WP has RCA properties.
90
  
 It may seem superfluous to discuss whether WP is regulated as an RCA in the 
Chemical Weapons Convention after concluding above that WP classifies as a toxic 
chemical. It is difficult to think of an application of WP which would be restricted 
because of WP‘s RCA properties, but not its toxic properties. It has been made clear 
above, however, that there is disagreement among legal experts and among states about 
whether e.g. using WP for ―flushing out‖ combatants is prohibited under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. It might be the case that restrictions of the use of WP because of 
its RCA properties could be more easily agreed upon than those stemming from its 
toxic properties. For example, if one takes the position that the ―flushing out‖ tactic of 
Fallujah depended on WP smoke causing ―sensory irritation‖, rather than ―temporary 
incapacitation‖, then regulations stemming from WP‘s RCA properties would apply, 
but not those from its toxic properties.  
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 The difference between RCA and toxic chemicals in regard to the rules of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is a topic of debate. The United States position is that 
RCA is a separate category from toxic chemicals (thus not a ―chemical weapon‖). The 
argumentation is that Chemical Weapons Convention Article I(5) – which prohibits 
RCA as a method of warfare – is superfluous if RCA is regulated in the same way as 
chemical weapons. The United States government has argued that Article I (5) was 
included as a compromise in the negotiations, and agreed by the United States in 
exchange for leaving RCA outside the definition of chemical weapons.
91
 This is the 
divergent view, however, as most states and legal experts seem to agree that RCA falls 
within the definition of toxic chemicals and is therefore subjected to the same set of 
restrictions and regulations as lethal chemical weapons.
92
 Gro Nystuen has argued that 
the wording of the convention is the most important – in line with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Article 31 – and that the wording does not 
exclude RCA from chemical weapons definition, but on the contrary indicates that RCA 
is a subcategory.
93
  
 I agree with Nystuen on this point. Particularly revealing, in my opinion, is 
article II(9), which defines the term ―purposes not prohibited under this convention‖ as  
―law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes‖ (one of alternative 
definitions).
94
 Although the term ―purposes not prohibited under this convention‖ is 
used 14 times in the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is not used directly in 
conjunction with the prohibition or definition of RCA (i.e. Articles I(5) and II(7). The 
definition in Article II(9)(d) must therefore refer to the definition of a ―chemical 
weapon‖ in Article II(1)(a), which deals with ―toxic chemicals and their precursors‖.  
For a certain application of WP to be considered illegal under the regulations for 
RCA, it must also be used as a ―method of warfare‖. ―Method of warfare‖ is not defined 
in the Chemical Weapons Convention. According to Ernest Harper, this was intentional, 
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and the result of the need to find a compromise between polarized parties in the 
negotiations over the Chemical Weapons Convention text.
95
 Harper concludes that the 
term should be defined in the following manner: ―Riot Control Agents are a method of 
warfare when used to systematically enable or multiply the use of lethal force against 
hostile enemies.‖96 If an RCA is used in order to avoid the use of lethal force and save 
lives, however, it should not be regarded as being used as a ―method of warfare‖.97 This 
is also the US position on the subject.
98
 Reyhani arrives at a similar conclusion, arguing 
that if an RCA is used to flush out combatants in order to kill them, then this must 
certainly be regarded as a ―method of warfare‖.99  
 The lack of a definition of ―method of warfare‖ makes it difficult to arrive at a 
strong conclusion in regard to the permissibility of using WP when considering that its 
smoke has RCA properties. For this reason, it is tempting to agree with Harper that the 
key issue should be whether RCAs are applied as force multipliers. However, since the 
text of the Chemical Weapons Convention is unclear on this point, one should not 
venture too far in narrowing the meaning of the term ―method of warfare‖, particularly 
if Harper is right in stating that the term was intentionally left undefined. Furthermore, 
it is certainly debatable whether ―method of warfare‖ can be generally contingent on 
lethality. Hypothetically, RCAs could be used as a non-lethal a means to force the 
civilian population out of an area as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Certainly, 
such a tactic should be regarded as a ―method of warfare‖.  
 In any case, it is not necessary to provide a specific definition of ―method of 
warfare‖ that would be applicable in all circumstances for the purposes of this 
dissertation. As far as WP weapons are concerned, it should suffice to conclude that 
there does not seem to be disagreement among legal experts that using RCA as a lethal 
force multiplier would fall into the category of ―method of warfare‖. Therefore it seems 
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fairly safe to conclude that the use of WP in this manner would be prohibited under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. This prohibition is most clearly relevant to the 
―flushing out‖ tactics discussed. Employment of such tactics is prohibited under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
100
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4  White Phosphorus and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
To what extent are WP weapons regulated in the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons of 1980 (Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects)? In this chapter, I will first discuss whether WP weapons fall 
into the category of ―incendiary weapons‖ as defined in the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, then discuss whether and to what extend the common uses of 
WP weapons are regulated by this convention.  
 
4.1 Are White Phosphorus Weapons Incendiary Weapons as Defined in the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons? 
Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons) deals with incendiary 
weapons. There is no doubt that WP weapons have the capability to set fire to persons 
and objects, and is therefore an incendiary in the common use of this term. Protocol III, 
however, sets the threshold for an incendiary somewhat higher. For this reason, the US 
military has argued – in defence of allegations of the use of WP in Fallujah – that the 
WP weapons indeed are incendiary, but not as defined under the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons.
101
 Protocol III defined an ―incendiary weapon‖ as ―any weapon 
or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to 
persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a 
chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target [my italics].‖102 The crucial 
words are ―primarily designed‖, which seem to require that for a weapon to be covered 
by the definition it is not sufficient that it has the potential to be incendiary, but that this 
                                                 
101
 A statement was made to this effect by General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
referred in ―U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Munitions in Iraq‖, 487. 
102
 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol III, Article 1(1).   
 26 
potential must be the primary function of the weapon. This relates to the purpose of 
design of the weapon in question, not its actual military application.   
In the case of WP weapons, this would mean that if the weapon is designed to 
create a smoke screen, but can in fact also be used for incendiary purposes, it would fall 
outside the definition. Indeed, the protocol specifically excludes from the ―incendiary 
weapons‖ category munitions with ―incidental incendiary effects‖, such as illuminants, 
tracers, smoke or signalling systems.
103
 However, if the primarily designed purpose of a 
specific WP weapon is incendiary, it will fall under the definition in Protocol III.
104
  
There is disagreement about how Protocol III applies to specific WP weapons. 
Peter Herby, head of the Arms Unit at the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), is reported to have said that Protocol III does apply to WP weapons as they 
were used in Operation Cast Lead.
105
 Of course, a statement to a newspaper is not 
necessarily the result of a thorough legal analysis, but the source of the quote makes it 
significant. For this reason, it is referred to by Human Rights Watch in its report on 
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, in which it accepts the position that Protocol III covers 
WP weapons in this regard.
106
  
Reyhani argues that the WP weapons that were used in Fallujah fall under the 
definition in Protocol III.
107
 He argues further that the US would have been in breach of 
Protocol III, Article 2(3) if it had ratified the protocol, because WP weapons were 
delivered from the ground without knowledge of who it would be hitting.
108
 In contrast, 
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Solis argues that WP was used as an incendiary in Fallujah, but that this use against 
combatants would not have been prohibited under the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons Protocol III, even if the US had ratified it at the time.
109
 
Similarly, MacLeod and Rogers also conclude that the use of WP weapons in Fallujah 
was not illegal under Protocol III.
110
  
The disagreements described above may stem from the lack of full clarity of the 
definitions in Protocol III. The protocol is clear in that it‘s definition of incendiary 
weapons cover only this primarily designed to have this function, and does not cover 
incidental incendiary effects. A problem that is unsolved in the text, however, is that 
most WP weapons will have incendiary effects that might not be considered explicitly 
as a primary function, but still can be important effects in practice. For example, a WP 
mortar can be designed for creating a smoke screen, but can also be used for ―flushing 
out‖ combatants through its combined incendiary and smoke generating effects. In this 
case, the incendiary effect would not be the explicitly stated primary function of the 
weapon, but still one that is generally recognised, and which increases the applicability 
of the weapon. There is little guidance in Protocol III to tell us whether how to deal 
with a weapon that has incendiary effects that are neither explicitly primary nor 
incidental. Furthermore, there is nothing that definitively tells us who has the authority 
to determine what the primary designed function of the weapon is.  
What if the manufacturer of a weapon explicitly states that the designed purpose 
is to create a smoke screen, but in fact also relies on dual use-functions including 
incendiary effects of the weapon for its sale? Since the text does not specify exactly 
who has the authority to decide what the primary designed function of a given weapon 
is, it seems reasonable that this cannot rest exclusively with the designer or 
manufacturer of the weapon, but must be decided after taking all relevant aspects into 
account. If the ―real‖ primary function of a weapon is another than that which is stated, 
then the ―real‖ function must be regarded as the one which is legally relevant.  
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This may be clear in principle, but will be difficult in practice. The same mortar 
type can be used for creating a smoke screen in one context and as an incendiary in 
another. In this case, it is clear that the creation of a smoke screen is one primary 
function, but unclear if the incendiary effects should also be regarded as a primary 
function. The words in protocol III indicate that potential or actual effects of the 
weapon are not relevant for the definition. The emphasis on ―design‖ in the definition of 
an incendiary weapon, and the complementary dismissal of ―incidental effects‖, shows 
that the convention is not to be understood in that way.  
One way to sort this out could be to consider whether the weapon would have 
been likely to have been as widely distributed had it not been for the incendiary 
function. It is feasible that militaries will purchase, and distribute to the battlefield, 
munitions on the basis of their primary functions, and not their incidental ones. If the 
versatility of a weapon is what makes it attractive – due to its dual-use potential – then 
all functions that would combine to significantly increase versatility should be regarded 
as primary. The reason is that if one of these functions would be taken away, the 
versatility would decrease, and the distribution of the weapon would probably do the 
same. Therefore, if it is probable that a mortar type would be less widely distributed if it 
did not have an incendiary effect, then this would be evidence that the incendiary effect 
should overall be considered to be equivalent to a primary function.  
  
The conclusion is that only WP weapons which are primarily designed to function as 
incendiaries are clearly covered by Protocol III of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons. If it is unclear whether incendiary function of a WP weapons 
should be regarded as primary or incidental, an overall assessment must be made to 
determine whether the weapons falls under the definition. A relevant test would be to 
estimate whether the weapon would be less widely distributed if it did not have an 
incendiary effect.  
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4.2 Legality of the Uses of White Phosphorus Weapons under the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons 
Protocol III includes four types of prohibitions on incendiary weapons. First, it prohibits 
making civilians and civilian objects the object of attack of incendiary weapons.
111
 
Second, it places restrictions on air-delivered incendiary weapons, by prohibiting such 
tactics for use against objects within a concentration of civilians.
112
 Third, it prohibits 
the use of incendiary weapons (also ground-delivered) within civilian concentrations 
unless the military objective is clearly separated and feasible precautions have been 
made to minimise civilian injury and damage.
113
 Finally, Protocol III prohibits the use 
of incendiary weapons on forests and plant cover.
114
 Notably, there is nothing in 
Protocol III that prohibits anti-personnel uses of incendiary weapons against 
combatants.  
What is the significance of the four prohibitions in the Protocol? The first and 
third prohibitions of Protocol III actually seem quite redundant. There are undisputed 
rules in customary international humanitarian law that require distinction between 
military and civilian targets, and that prohibit the targeting of civilians and civilian 
objects.
115
 These basic principles, to which I return in the next chapter, apply without 
question to both incendiary and non-incendiary weapons. The only additional restriction 
in Protocol III, therefore, is the limitation on air-delivered incendiary weapons on 
targets within civilian concentration.
116
  
Out of the types of uses of WP weapons described in the introduction, only that 
which involves the direct use of WP as an incendiary weapon are clearly covered in 
Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Even this application 
of WP, however, is not prohibited under the convention if used against combatants or 
objects that are legitimate military targets. The other modes of application would be 
covered if it can be reasonably established that the incendiary effect of the WP weapons 
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can be said to be a primary effect by design. Even so, the restrictions on use are not 
severe. ―Flushing out‖ combatants, or using WP weapons for creation of a smoke 
screen, illumination or marking a target, would only be prohibited if the attack in 
question involved the use of WP weapons that can be assumed to have an incendiary 
function as a primary effect by design and if it was used in a context where the risk of 
injuring or damaging civilian persons or objects would be at unacceptably high.  
 
 31 
5  White Phosphorus and Customary International Humanitarian Law 
In this chapter, I will first discuss the relevance of selected rules of customary 
international humanitarian law for WP weapons, and then discuss whether and to what 
extent the common uses of WP weapons are regulated by customary international 
humanitarian law.  
 
5.1 White Phosphorus and the Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Which rules of customary international humanitarian law may apply to WP weapons? 
MacLeod and Rogers list four basic principles that they consider to be relevant: ―[1] 
that weapons must not be of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous 
injury; [2] must not be indiscriminate in their effects; [3] must not be treacherous in 
nature; and [4] must not be abhorrent to ordinary people.‖117 The list appears to contain 
the main principles that others have also used in similar analyses, and will therefore 
serve as a starting point for the following discussion.
118
 The exception is the third 
principle on the list (treacherousness), which I will not discuss further. According to 
MacLeod and Rogers, this principle is probably the rationale behind the prohibition 
against poisonous, poison gas, chemical and biological weapons.
119
 The reason why I 
disregard this principle here, is that I have chosen to exclude the discussion of 
international regulation of poisonous and poison gas weapons from this dissertation, 
and that I have discussed the toxicity of WP in regard to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention at length.  
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5.1.1 The Principle of No Unnecessary Suffering or Superfluous Injury 
The first principle on the list, prohibition of weapons that are of a nature to cause 
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, follows from one of the basic rules of 
customary international humanitarian law, which is listed as Rule 70 in the 2005 ICRC 
Study: ―The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited‖.120 MacLeod and Rogers‘ 
principle follows logically from this rule, because if a weapon is of such a nature that it 
causes unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, all use of this weapon would be 
contrary to that rule.  
Rule 70 is actually a two-fold rule: It prohibits weapons that by their nature 
cause unnecessary suffering and also the use of weapons in such a manner that they are 
likely to cause unnecessary suffering.
121
  Of course, it would still be more difficult to 
prove that a given weapon type is of such a nature, than to argue that a certain use of 
that weapon type is contrary to customary international humanitarian law.  
The ICJ has called the principle of no unnecessary suffering or superfluous 
injury one of the ―cardinal principles‖ of international humanitarian law.122 It is codified 
in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I (1977) of the Geneva conventions (1949), and 
similar rules are mentioned in the preamble of the St. Petersburg-declaration and in 
Article 23(d) of the Hague Regulations 1907.
123
 That the rule has status as customary 
international law is not in dispute, but the trouble is to determine what exactly 
constitutes ―superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering‖ – a phrase that will have 
different meanings to different people.
124
 For example, one may ask if WP weapons 
really cause more suffering than, say, being hit by a regular rifle bullet. Certainly, the 
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WP wound would look worse from the outside, but it could be less deadly and the 
internal damage need not necessarily be worse. 
A notable effort to resolve this problem was made through the so-called SIrUS 
project.
125
 Medical staff of the ICRC put forward a proposal of four tests, of which each 
would imply unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The conditions are that the 
effects of the weapons must be design-dependent and foreseeable when used against 
human beings, and cause one of these four effects: 
1. Specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, specific abnormal 
psychological state, specific and permanent disability or specific disfigurement. 
2. Field mortality of more than 25 % or a hospital mortality of more than 5 %.  
3. Grade 3 wounds as measured by the Red Cross wound classification (10 cm. or 
more in skin cavity).  
4. Effects for which there is no well recognized and proven treatment.126 
 
The document explains further how these criteria apply to weapons that are already 
prohibited. Significantly, they argue that Criterion 1 and possibly Criteria 2 and 4 apply 
to chemical weapons.
127
 Furthermore, they argue that these criteria also apply to 
weapons which are ―subject to either a review of the law pertaining to them or 
widespread stigmatization‖, notably that Criterion 2 and possibly Criterion 1 apply to 
―burning weapons‖.128 
 The four tests of the SIrUS project are perhaps the best criteria available at the 
present time for defining the concept of ―unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury‖, 
but they also illustrate how a precise interpretation of the term still seems remote. In 
most cases, it is not possible to read the four tests as a form of algorithm leading to a 
clear result in regard to WP weapons, but they can at least serve as guidelines. 
Specifically, one could argue that criterion 1 would be met by WP weapons, because 
WP is likely to cause an abnormal physiological state through its chemical reaction with 
the human body. It is not certain if criterion 2 will also be met, because the mortality 
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rate from WP burns is uncertain. In the mentioned case report in The Lancet, the 
authors‘ write that ―White phosphorus burns are associated with significant morbidity 
often necessitating lengthy hospital stays. Extreme cases can be fatal [my italics]‖, but 
also note that WP burns ―are rarely encountered in practice and literature describing 
cases is limited.‖129 Criterion 3 is likely to be met when WP weapons are used directly 
against individuals. Criterion 4 will not be met.
130
 In sum, the approach provided by 
these tests strengthens the case for arguing that the principle of no unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury may apply at least to certain applications of WP 
weapons.  
 State practice is also relevant. The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 
(2004) advises against using WP directly against personnel, stating that the principle of 
no unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury ―[...] applies to white phosphorus, which 
is designed to set fire to targets such as fuel and ammunition dumps or for use to create 
smoke, and which should not be used directly against personnel‖.131  
There is also another rule of customary international humanitarian law that 
should be considered in this context, namely Rule 85 in the 2005 ICRC Study: ―The 
anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons is prohibited, unless it is not feasible to use a 
less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat.‖132 This rule is based on the 
more general Rule 70.
133
 Rule 85 does not specify that the incendiary effect must be 
―primary‖, as is the case with Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Protocol 
III. There is therefore no disagreement that WP weapons are considered incendiary as 
far as Rule 85 is concerned. The rule shows that there is no general prohibition on the 
use of WP weapons on combatants due to its incendiary properties, but with the 
restriction that other and less harmful weapons must be applied instead, if they can fulfil 
the same military purpose.
134
 It is worth noting that rule 85 is less restrictive than the 
position found in the The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, because the British 
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position is that WP should not be used, whereas the Rule 85 states that it may be used if 
necessary.
135
  
It is not clear if Rule 85 implies that there are more severe restrictions on 
incendiary weapons than on other weapons, by customary international law. William 
Boothby has rightly pointed out that combatants are obligated by the principle of no 
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to use a less harmful weapon in all cases, if 
the military effect would be the same.
136
 It is even imaginable that, in some cases, an 
incendiary weapon could be less harmful than other alternatives. On these grounds, one 
may certainly question the value-added of Rule 85 in relation to the more general 
principle. However, there is no doubt about the fact that that the general principle also 
covers incendiary weapons.  
 The question of whether there are alternatives to WP with which one may 
achieve the same military effects is critical. It is difficult, of course, to provide a 
definitive answer to this, because alternative munitions have other characteristics – e.g. 
they might require more time to create a usable smoke screen – that may or may not be 
seen as decisive disadvantages. However, there are many who have argued that viable 
alternatives do exist. In regard to the use of WP weapons in Operation Cast Lead, 
Human Rights Watch has argued that alternatives were available in the form of 155 mm 
smoke projectiles, which it claims are more easily deployed over a wider area, cause no 
damage to civilians, and are manufactured by the Israeli Military Industries (IMI).
137
 
The Goldstone report has also concluded that alternatives do exist and which are free 
from the hazards of WP.
138
  
 Nothing of the above suggests that WP weapons as such should be considered 
illegal as such. There are, however, clearly binding restrictions on the use of WP 
weapons. Applications of such weapons in a manner that cause unnecessary suffering or 
superfluous injury for human beings, including combatants, are prohibited. This would 
most clearly be relevant if WP weapons are used directly against combatants.  
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5.1.2 The Principle of Distinction  
The second principle on MacLeod and Rogers‘ list is the principle of distinction 
between civilians and civilian objectives on the one hand and combatants and military 
objectives on the other. This rule is also stated in the 2005 ICRC Study, as Rule 71: 
―The use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate is prohibited.‖139 This rule 
follows from the more general principles laid out in Rule 1, which requires that attacks 
may only be carried out against combatants and not civilians, and Rule 7, which 
requires that the parties to a conflict attack military objects only, and never civilian 
objects.
140
 Similar to the principle of no unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, the 
ICJ refers to the principle of distinction as a ―cardinal principle‖ of international 
humanitarian law.
141
 Dinstein refers to it as ―probably the most fundamental pillar‖ of 
the law of international armed conflict.
142
 The fundamental principles of civilian 
immunity and distinction between civilians and military are also codified in Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1977), Articles 48, 51(2), and 52(2).
143
Among 
other weapons types, the legality of landmines has been challenged on this basis.
144
  
Rule 84 of the 2005 ICRC Study introduces a further specification of the 
principle when incendiary weapons are used: ―If incendiary weapons are used, 
particular care must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.‖145 The rule does not 
require that the incendiary properties of the weapon be ―primary‖, as in Protocol III of 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, so WP weapons are clearly 
regulated by this rule.  
Rule 84, however, goes no further than the general Rules 1 and 7, and has on 
this basis been criticised for being ―entirely superfluous‖.146 One could perhaps argue 
that the words ―particular care‖ indicate that Rule 84 further enhances the requirement 
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for a clear distinction, indicating that this is an even more pressing matter when 
incendiary weapons are concerned. This line of reasoning seems flawed, however. 
Boothby has rightly pointed out that the general principle of distinction as specified in 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 57(2)(ii) requires the attacker 
to take ―all feasible precautions‖ to avoid damage to civilian persons or objects.147 It is 
difficult to see how the demand for ―particular care‖ in using incendiary weapons can 
exceed the demand for taking ―all feasible precautions‖.  
 Regardless, it is clear that none of the rules described above dictate that WP 
weapons are illegal as such. On this point, Steven Haines has concluded as follows:  
 
On their own, however, the customary norms in Rules 70 and 71 are neither sufficiently 
persuasive nor prescriptive enough to lead directly to the banning of specific types of 
weapons. This is something that seems to require formal agreement in the form of treaty 
law.
148
 
 
Although one can question whether Haines‘ conclusion would hold for all weapons 
types, I believe it is accurate in regard to WP weapons specifically. The most common 
justification of WP weapons is that it is intended to be used as an obscurant. If this 
mode of application is deployed in the open field with little risk of hurting either 
combatants or civilians, there is nothing in any of the Rules I described above that 
would prevent WP weapons from being used legally.  
Still, there are reasons for arguing that the principle of distinction may apply to 
certain applications of WP weapons. Reyhani concludes that the US military was in 
violation of Rule 84 in Fallujah, which was an urban area and where the risk of causing 
injury to civilians and civilian objects is likely to have been significant.
149
 There is also 
significant evidence that indicates that WP weapons may have been used in breach of 
the principle in Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Human Rights Watch has attempted to 
document this in its mentioned report.
150
 Although the report has been heavily criticised 
by the Israeli government, it presents convincing evidence that WP weapons were used 
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over urban areas, in which the risk of civilian injury must have been high (see image 
and map, below). The Israelis have claimed that their use of WP during the operation 
was legal, and have particularly stressed that it was used for the creation of smoke 
screens.
151
 Two Israeli officers were later reprimanded for the WP attack documented in 
the image and map below.
152
  
 
Image 3
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Image 4
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5.1.3 The Martens Clause 
The final principle on MacLeod and Rogers‘ list is that of ―abhorrence to ordinary 
people‖. They claim that blinding laser weapons fall into this category and are 
prohibited for that reason.
155
  The ―abhorrence principle‖ of MacLeod and Rogers bears 
strong resemblance to the so-called ―Martens clause‖. This term refers to the paragraph 
stated in the preamble of Hague Conventions II (1899) and IV (1907); that until a more 
complete code of laws of war has been issued, the Contracting Parties will recognize 
that inhabitants remain protected by the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience.
156
 The clause can be interpreted to prohibit weapons that arouse 
―widespread revulsion‖ in the public.157  
 It is curious that MacLeod and Rogers introduce what they label an ―abhorrence 
principle‖ instead of referring to the Martens clause. This clause is a well-known part of 
customary international humanitarian law. It is, for example, referred to in many of the 
cases before the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia.
158
 The International 
Court of Justice has stated that the Martens clause ―has proved to be an effective means 
of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology‖.159 A modern version of the 
clause is found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 1(2):  
 
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international 
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law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience.
160
 
 
There appears to be no significant difference between the ―abhorrence principle‖ and 
the ―Martens clause‖ in regard to the assessment of the legality of WP weapons. The 
key words are in the reference to ―the principles of humanity and from the dictates of 
public conscience‖. Although these criteria are certainly vague, the formulation is 
clearly one that would render weapons that cause general revulsion or abhorrence 
illegal as means of warfare. I will in the following refer to ―the Martens clause‖ rather 
than ―the abhorrence principle‖, since the two seem to overlap completely in the context 
of discussing the legality of WP weapons.  
The main problem when arguing that the Martens clause can be interpreted as 
placing concrete restrictions on certain types of weapons is that the terms are too vague 
to provide clear guidance. What exactly does it mean to be in compliance with the 
―principles of humanity‖ and ―the dictates of public conscience‖? Who decides what the 
principles of humanity are and what the public conscience is? Dinstein has argued that 
the Martens clause cannot constitute an additional standard for judging the legality of 
specific means and methods of warfare: ―General revulsion in the face of a particular 
conduct during hostilities (even if it transcends fluctuations of public opinion) does not 
create ‗an independent legal criterion regulating weaponry‘ or methods of warfare.‖161 
In essence, he argues that the Martens clause cannot be seen as positive law, although 
he believes it can function as a form of mission statement to further develop 
international humanitarian treaty law.
162
  
Dinstein‘s opinion runs contrary to that of MacLeod and Rogers, who indicate 
that the ―abhorrence principle‖ could be seen as positive law.163 Gro Nystuen has 
claimed that the Martens clause can be seen as a form of positive law: ―It can [...] be 
said that the Martens Clause constitutes a fundamental humanitarian restriction on 
permissible weapons, irrespective of how great a military utility value they might 
have.‖164 Neither of the above have argued, however, that the Martens clause prohibits 
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WP weapons as such. There are good reasons for this, as some of the main applications 
of WP would not be seen as inhumane. For example, there is no reason to believe that 
the use of WP for creation of a smoke screen in the open field, in which it is unlikely 
that there are any civilians, would be generally perceived as being contrary to the 
principles of humanity.  
It is also questionable whether the Martens clause can provide any 
argumentative force behind a claim that certain uses of WP are prohibited when 
compared with the principles of distinction and of no unnecessary suffering or 
superfluous injury. It is difficult to think of a case where the use of WP would be 
considered to be in breach of the Martens clause, but not of the latter two principles. 
These principles are also more specific and the principle of lex specialis should 
therefore render the Martens clause irrelevant for the question of the present legality of 
WP weapons.  
There may be value added of the Martens clause in this regard, however, if it is 
read as a ―mission statement‖ of international humanitarian law, rather than as a 
positive regulation in itself. This is in line with Dinstein‘s perception of it.165 Although 
one can certainly debate to what extent WP weapons are generally perceived to run 
contrary to the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience, there 
are undoubtedly indications of a considerable international sentiment that would favour 
stronger regulations and possibly a general prohibition of WP weapons. I return to this 
line of reasoning under the discussion of further codification of IHL in regard to WP 
weapons.  
 
 
5.2 Legality of the Uses of White Phosphorus Weapons under Customary 
International Humanitarian Law 
None of the principles of customary international humanitarian law described in this 
chapter leads to the conclusion that WP weapons should be considered to be prohibited 
as such. Two of the principles may apply to certain uses of WP weapons, however, 
namely the principle of no unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury and the principle 
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of distinction. These principles place no greater restrictions on WP weapons than on 
other types of weapons. Still, certain features of WP weapons indicate that these rules 
are of particular relevance under certain circumstances.  
Particularly significant in regard to the principle of distinction is the area effect 
of WP weapons that have been designed for the creation of smoke screens. This 
application of WP necessitates its delivery over a wider area. It is interesting to note 
that the ―area effects‖ of a weapon have received increased attention in international 
law in the past decade. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008), for example, 
stresses the need to ―avoid indiscriminate area effects‖ in its Article 2(2)(c).166 Bonnie 
Docherty has commented that ―[i]n both its narrow exclusions and condemnation of 
area effects, the convention‘s definition of cluster munitions strengthens precedent for 
more civilian protections in future weapons treaties.‖167 Many incendiary weapons, 
including WP weapons designed for air-burst, also have indiscriminate area effects.
168
 
The principle of the Convention on Cluster Munitions does not have status of customary 
international law, but can still be a relevant factor to consider when assessing whether 
specific applications of WP weapons is contrary to international law. For example, the 
use of WP weapons over populated areas is likely to place civilian persons and objects 
under considerable risk of injury and damage, as was seen during Operation Cast Lead.  
Still, I would not go as far as Human Rights Watch, which claims that ―air-
bursting WP over populated areas is unlawful because it places civilians at unnecessary 
risk and its wide dispersal of burning wedges may amount to an indiscriminate 
attack.‖169 This statement indicates that a general rule can be formulated that it is illegal 
to use WP weapons over populated areas, in all circumstances. It is conceivable, for 
example, that air-burst WP could be used as an illuminant and burst at a high enough 
altitude for it to be of no significant risk to civilian persons and objects. Therefore, the 
legality of the use of WP weapons must be considered under the circumstances of the 
individual case. Still, most of the applications of WP weapons described in this 
dissertation, if used in or over populated areas could under the circumstances be in 
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violation of the principle of distinction. This includes the applications of marking a 
target, use as an obscurant, for creation of a smoke screen, for ―flushing out‖ 
combatants, and certainly for use of WP weapons as an incendiary weapon. The danger 
posed by using WP burster rounds for illumination purposes may be less, due to their 
high optimal air-burst altitude. The same can be said for the principle of no unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury. With a basis in the principles that have been suggested 
through the SIrUS project for testing whether a weapon should be considered to cause 
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, it is certainly possible to argue that WP 
weapons fall into this category if used directly against combatants. Indeed, the British 
military has gone far in advising that such use should generally be avoided.
170
 Certainly, 
the use of WP weapons for setting fire to objects and persons and for ―flushing out‖ 
combatants can under the circumstances be in violation of this principle. However, 
there must always be an assessment of the level of military necessity in the 
circumstances of the individual case, including what other means were available for 
rendering the enemy combatants hors de combat. One cannot à priori dismiss a claim 
that the use of WP weapons for ―flushing out‖ combatants under the circumstances may 
have been militarily necessary.  
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6  Conclusions on the Legality of the Modes of Application of White Phosphorus 
Weapons 
What can be concluded about the legality of the five modes of application of WP 
weapons that were described in the introduction? There are two general conclusions: 
First, there is no prohibition of WP weapons as such. Second, the risk of violating the 
principle of distinction seems significant for all the uses of WP discussed here, and 
more so than many other weapons types because of the ―area effect‖ of these weapons.  
 
The following can be concluded about the specific modes of application of WP 
weapons, respectively:  
 
1. Use of WP for creation of a smoke screen. This is clearly legal when used in the open 
field with no significant risk of harming civilian persons or objects. If used over a 
populated area, however, the action may be in illegal due to the principle of distinction.  
 
2. Use of WP burster rounds for illumination. The same applies to this mode of 
application as for the creation of a smoke screen, except that the danger to civilians on 
the ground would normally be less, because the optimal air-burst altitude is as high as 
500 meters above ground.
171
  
 
3. Use of WP for marking a target. This mode of application is legal, provided that the 
principle of distinction is taken into account. The principle of no unnecessary suffering 
or superfluous injury may also apply, depending on the circumstances.  
 
4. Use of WP for “flushing out” combatants. There is no clear prohibition on the use of 
WP weapons against combatants. There is a case, however, for arguing that the 
Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits use of WP for ―flushing out‖-tactics. WP and 
its by-product, phosphorus pentoxide, both have toxic properties, and these properties 
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seem to be an integral part of the ―flushing out‖ tactic, which for this reason should be 
regarded as contrary to Chemical Weapons Convention. The use of WP in this tactic is 
also in breach of Chemical Weapons Convention Article I(5), because WP is used as an 
RCA. There is, however, significant disagreement in the legal opinions on the matter. 
Therefore, it should also be mentioned that both the principles of distinction and of no 
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury may apply, depending on the 
circumstances. The latter would certainly apply if there were alternative means 
available, which could be used to achieve the same military purpose.  
 
5. Use of WP for incendiary purposes. Protocol III of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons is relevant, but it does not render illegal the use of WP weapons 
against combatants or objects that are legitimate military targets. In its restrictions, 
Protocol III goes no further than what is already part of customary international 
humanitarian law with regard to the principles of distinction and of no unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury, except in regard to air-delivered WP weapons. The 
principle of no unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury renders the application of 
WP weapons directly against combatants illegal, but only if it cannot be justified as 
militarily necessary.  
 
The above conclusions will of course not gain universal acceptance. The discussion in 
the previous chapters shows that there is significant disagreement both among states 
and in published legal opinions about the regulation of WP weapons and the use of 
these in specific cases. This disagreement seems to result in significant controversy 
when WP weapons are actually used, notably resulting in debates about the legality of 
their use in Fallujah in 2004 and in Gaza 2008-2009. These disagreements are mostly 
over facts, but are nonetheless indicative of the reality that the law is not clear enough 
to lead to agreement in the actual cases.  
The disagreement over the relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention for 
the use of WP in Fallujah, for example, is presumably one of facts, and not of law. 
However, it should be noted in regard to Fallujah, where the use of WP weapons is 
fairly well documented, there is no agreement on whether the use of WP was reliant on 
its toxic properties. One should think that this would be easy to establish, but clearly it 
is not. In regard to Operation Cast Lead, Human Rights Watch concludes that the use of 
 47 
WP in the specific cases that it documents was illegal – as does the Goldstone report – 
while the Israelis claim it was legal.
172
 Here, international law fails to provide 
sufficiently clear guidance to resolve a profound disagreement.  
It should not be controversial to conclude that there are unsolved problems in 
regard to the international regulations on WP weapons: It is clear that there is no 
general prohibition on WP weapons, while it is equally clear that the actual applications 
of WP weapons is in many cases legally problematic. Furthermore, it seems apparent 
that the use of WP weapons in the past decade has been widely perceived as unethical, 
if not actually illegal. This shows that a case can be made for clearer and stronger 
regulation of WP weapons internationally.  
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7  The Case for International Regulation of White Phosphorus Weapons 
Based on the newspaper coverage of the use of WP in Fallujah and in Gaza, it seems 
probable that there is a widespread disregard both among governments and in the 
general public for the use of WP weapons. For example, the Russian Duma (Parliament) 
issued a statement in 2005 in which it condemned the use of phosphorus bombs under 
any circumstances and stated that such bombs are banned by international treaties even 
―under cover of noble aims of the fight against terrorism‖.173 Another example is a 
statement by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. In response to questions about 
whether the Italian government would condemn the US military‘s use of WP in Iraq he 
said that ―[i]f white phosphorus was used, condemnation is absolutely inevitable.‖174 
There is also significant evidence that a large number of states would be positive 
to stronger regulation of WP weapons. Following the Human Rights Council‘s probe 
into Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, the Goldstone report was submitted to the Council on 
29 September 2009. One of the recommendations was this:  
 
While accepting that white phosphorus is not at this stage proscribed under 
international law, the Mission considers that the repeated misuse of the substance by the 
Israeli armed forces during this operation calls into question the wisdom of allowing its 
continued use without some further degree of control. The Mission understands the 
need to use obscurants and illuminants for various reasons during military operations 
and especially in screening troops from observation or enemy fire. There are, however, 
other screening and illuminating means which are free from the toxicities, volatilities 
and hazards that are inherent in the chemical white phosphorus. The use of white 
phosphorus in any form in and around areas dedicated to the health and safety of 
civilians has been shown to carry very substantial risks. The Mission therefore believes 
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that serious consideration should be given to banning the use of white phosphorus as 
an obscurant [my italics].
175
   
 
This paragraph must be read as a recommendation to seriously consider banning WP 
weapons altogether. In the recommendation section of the report, the Mission writes 
that ―in the Mission's view, the use of WP as an obscurant at least should be banned 
because of the number and variety of hazards that attach to the use of such a pyrophoric 
chemical.‖176 Even though the words of the paragraph actually include only the use of 
WP ―as an obscurant‖, the reason for the proposed ban must be not to prevent the use of 
substances that can obscure military movements, but to prevent the misuse of WP 
weapons that may be initially designed and intended for use as obscurants.  
 On 15 October 2009, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution on the 
report, in which it:  
 
―Endorses the recommendations contained in the report of the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission, and calls upon all concerned parties 
including United Nations bodies, to ensure their implementation in accordance 
with their respective mandates‖.177 
 
In this resolution, the Council thus endorsed all the recommendations in the report, 
without reservations, including the recommendation regarding WP. The resolution was 
passed with 25 votes in favour, 6 against and 11 abstaining. 
The Goldstone report is 575 pages, and one may question whether all countries 
thoroughly considered all parts of the report equally worth endorsing. Still, the 
resolution is quite clear, and one must assume that the votes were cast with an 
understanding in regard to what recommendations were endorsed. However, the 
negative votes that were cast, as well as the abstentions, may have been founded on 
other reasons than the recommendation regarding WP. One can therefore not 
automatically assume that these states were not in favour of the WP recommendation 
out of the significant number of recommendations in the report.  
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Later that year, on 2 November 2009, the United Nations General Assembly 
passed a resolution following up the report from the Human Rights Council. The 
General Assembly did not give an indisputable endorsement of the recommendations in 
the Goldstone report, but it did endorse the report of the Human Rights Council from its 
12
th
 Session, which contains the full text of the relevant resolution.
178
 The resolution 
passed with 114 votes in favour, 18 against and 44 abstentions.
179
 As with the UN 
Human Right Council, the resolution in the General Assembly was not mainly abut WP 
weapons, and attitudes toward WP can thus not explain the voting pattern. However, the 
recommendation regarding WP is clear in the report, and the wide range of countries 
that supported the resolution indicates that the call for stronger regulation of WP does 
not seem improbable.  
Another significant indication of states‘ regard for stronger regulation of WP 
weapons is the study of state practice in relation to incendiary weapons in general. The 
2005 ICRC Study writes that in the discussions in the UN General Assembly that led to 
the adoption of the additional protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, incendiary weapons were a sensitive issue. A large number of states 
advocated a total prohibition of their use, and the majority of those who opposed a total 
ban, did urge strict restrictions in order to avoid civilian casualties.
180
 23 member states 
submitted formal proposals favouring a total prohibition on the use of incendiary 
weapons, including against combatants, to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional 
Weapons of the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of the Additional 
Protocols.
181
 Official statements in favour of a total ban were also made by a number of 
states, e.g. China, Madagascar, New Zealand, Peru, Syria, USSR and the UAE.
182
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However, it was necessary to achieve consensus in the Preparatory Conference 
for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. A compromise was attempted: 
To prohibit incendiary weapons against combatants with certain limitations, such as 
when they would be under armoured protection or in field fortifications, but the United 
States and to some degree the United Kingdom opposed.
183
 The result was the adoption 
of Protocol III, which scarcely provides any regulation that is stricter or more precise 
than that which was already part of customary international humanitarian law. Still, the 
process shows that there were a significant number of states that favoured a total ban or 
stronger restrictions on incendiary weapons. It also seems safe to assume that the 
regulation of incendiary weapons would have been stricter if there had been no demand 
for consensus when negotiating the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Finally, it is worth noting that some of the opposition to stronger regulation came from 
the United Kingdom, which in its Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004) goes 
further than Protocol III in restricting its own use of WP.
184
  
 
In conclusion, it seems that there may be significant support for imposing tighter 
restrictions on WP weapons than exist at the present, perhaps up to and including a total 
ban.  
 
7.1 Stronger restrictions: How? 
There are at least three ways to impose stronger international restrictions on WP 
weapons by treaty. First, WP could be added to the Annex on Chemicals of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, which lists the identified chemicals. WP could be 
added to this list, through the procedure described in Chemical Weapons Convention 
Article XV (5), see (4). Such an alteration would require at least 2/3 majority in favour 
of a Conference of State Parties.
185
 Adding WP to this list would settle disputes about 
whether WP weapons do in fact fall under the definitions of ―chemical weapons‖ and 
―riot control agents‖. Such a move would clarify the legality of the ―flushing out‖ tactic, 
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but would not end the debate about the other military applications of WP. The 
controversy arising from the burn effects of WP on humans would remain.  
 Second, one could seek to alter the protocols of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, either by revising or adding to Protocol III on incendiary 
weapons, or by adding a separate protocol on WP weapons, specifically. Either option 
can be pursued in the format of a Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties.
186
 
Because of the formal flexibility of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 
the state parties to the convention would in principle be free to impose any kind of 
restriction on WP weapons, from light restrictions to a total ban, while keeping in line 
with the purposes of the convention.
187
 The problem with this path is that alterations 
require consensus among the High Contracting Parties.
188
 With 114 state parties (at the 
time of writing, august 2011), there is a significant risk that the end result will not be as 
decisive as the majority of states would perhaps like. On the other hand, the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons Review Conference of 1995 was able to produce a 
fairly strong Protocol IV that prohibits the employment of laser weapons.
189
  
 Third, one could seek to construct a convention on WP weapons. This option 
would have the benefit of avoiding the demand for consensus in altering or adding to 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and would entail a greater freedom 
in regard to the end result than through alteration of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Examples of similar initiatives have been set through the processes that led 
to the Land Mines Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is worth 
noting that both of these issues were first discussed in context of the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons, but were then taken out of that forum when consensus 
on satisfactorily tight restrictions proved unattainable.
190
 In this way the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons has been the launching ground for two of the key 
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weapons conventions in IHL, proving that its Review Conferences are important forums 
for increasing awareness about central weapons issues confronting the international 
community.  
The third approach, however, is unlikely to lead to new regulations that would 
be universally ratified in the short or medium term. There is a significant risk that the 
approach will lead to a further fragmentation of international law, a well-known trend in 
recent decades.
191
 In assessing the advantages of the third approach, one would thus 
need to consider whether it is more desirable to introduce strong regulation for a few 
states in the hope that others will follow suit – but at the risk of increasing the 
fragmentation of international law – or to introduce weaker regulation that may be 
universally acceptable.  
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